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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of extreme shocks on stock and bond markets
on listed European banks. The originality of our approach consists in dealing jointly
with stock and bond markets and taking into account their interdependencies in
case of extreme events by using a specific CVRF (CVine Risk Factor) model which
combines copulas and a factorial structure. Moreover, contrary to what is generally
done in the literature, we do not focus only on the responses of the stock returns
but we also examine the response of the balance sheets of the banks and particularly
of their short term assets in order to assess their fragility in terms of liquidity. Our
main findings are the following: 1) the nature of the banks’ fragility has changed:
today, the interest rate risk should be the first concern before the equity risk, as
the banks have extensively increased their exposition to bond market due to flight-
to-quality reactions and to large investments in governments bonds after the rescue
operations the banks have benefited; 2) in case of a surge in the interest rate and
in the links between stock and bond returns, the portfolios of the biggest banks in
Europe would experience very severe shortfalls for both equity and liquidity buffers.
Accordingly regulators should monitor the evolution of dependencies between as-
sets and should pay utmost attention to the positive links between stock and bond
returns.
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1 Introduction
Since the last crisis, stress-testing has become a key supervisory tool. It has been used
frequently by the Federal reserve since 2008 and is now widespread among developed
countries as demonstrated by the stress-testing exercise conducted by the ECB (ECB,
2014) in the end of 2014. However these stress-tests focus on the impact of extreme
scenarios on banks’ equity leaving behind the liquidity issue (Arnould and Dehmej, 2015).
However banks highly rely on wholesale funding as it represents 61% of their liabilities
(IMF-GFRS, 2013). This funding is particularly prone to volatility and plays a central
role in transmitting shocks from the financial markets to the banks (Babihuga and Spaltro,
2014). As shown by the Northern Rock bankruptcy, wholesale funding and particularly
short term one is a major source of fragility. Lopez-Espinosa and al. (2013) even claim
that unstable funding is the most significant factor driving solvency risk and systemic
risk.
The short term sensitivity of a bank to a shock on financial markets depends on two
buffers: the equity buffer and the liquidity buffer. The first one is expected to absorb
losses and to allow the bank to continue to operate. The second one represents available
assets, offsetting the usual and additional repayments that may arise over a defined short
period of time under stress conditions. More precisely, it is the difference between liquid
assets that can be sold to repay a debt and short term debt which must be frequently
rolled-over or can be redeemed on short notice.
The approach we adopt enables us to implement stress test exercises on banks’ short
term balance sheet in order to develop a comparative analysis of banks’ individual expo-
sitions to market risks through the two buffers of equity and liquidity.
One part of the literature focuses on the equity buffer as, for example, Brownlees
and Engle (2015) with the SRISK which is the conditional capital shortfall of a bank
under a shock to the stock market. Another part focuses on banks’ liquidity position,
like (Brunnermeier et al., 2012), who develop the Liquidity Mismatch Index which by
assigning a liquidity level for each item of a bank’s balance sheet, can compare the global
liquidity of the assets and the one of the liabilities. Both buffers are linked : a strong
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equity buffer makes run on short term debt less likely and, conversely, a stronger liquidity
buffer makes banks more resilient and can lower the price of newly emitted equity. To
our knowledge, few papers have tried to link the two sides. Pierret (2015) show that
the SRISK is positively related to the book liquidity position of the bank but doesn’t
investigate the link.
In this paper we also aim at linking market equity buffer with market liquidity buffer
but also investigate the nature of the link, in order to give a exhaustive view of bank’s
short term fragility. More precisely we use detailed balance sheet of 38 listed European
banks, on the period 2005-2014, to build an equity buffer and a liquidity buffer. We use
the market value of the bank as the equity buffer as in Brownlees and Engle (2015). For
the liquidity buffer we relate to the liquidity ratios defined by Basel regulation (BCBS
, 2014) which build a ratio between short term assets and short term debt, namely the
LCR (Liquidity Coverage Ratio). We consider an asset to be of short term if it is a
trading asset held for trading, a derivative, or a very liquid assets (such as central bank
cash). The short term debt comprises all debt with a residual maturity less than one
year (senior or covered bonds) and wholesale funding that must be frequently rolled over
or can be redeemed on short notice (for example: bank deposits or deposits maturing
in less than 3 months). Followig Kahlert and Wagner (2015), we define 4 major sources
of market risk (equity, rate, commodity and foreign exchange) each item of our buffers
(either assets or liabilities) are assigned to an appropriate risk sources in order to evaluate
their fair value in case of a shock on one of our source of risk.
Then we construct the structure of dependencies between the sources of risk and the
item of our buffers, using a Cvine Risk Factors Model (CRFM) model as Bruneau et al.
(2015), which combines copulas and factors. We account for changes in the dependence
structure by using rolling windows in the estimation procedure. A particular advantage
of the CRFM framework lies in its ability to capture the tail dependencies for a large
number of assets, directly or indirectly through the factorial structure and to allow for
second round contagion. Over the period 2005-2014, our estimation results indeed reveal
tail dependencies of the retained common risk factors as displayed by Kendall’s taus and
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more specifically by the types of copulas and their parameters. Moreover we observe
clear changes in the dependence structure over time. Thanks to the modeling of the
interconnections between all source of risk, we are able to capture the indirect effects
of any global shock. For example, a shock on the index representative of the rate risk
impacts not only the bonds but also the equity, due to the link between this factor and
the market factor accounting for the stock market risk. We simulate shocks on market
indexes representing our 4 sources of risk and examine how the banks’ buffers of equity
and liquidity that we built respond.
We find that Bank’s solvability and liquidity fragility are intertwined, as outlined by
Pierret (2015). We observe that trading portfolio are quite sensitive to equity shocks
with significant potential losses. We also find that the banks of our panel still display
large fragility even if the liquidity position at the aggregate level has improved during
the considered period (2005-2014). If we look more closely, we observe that banks of
intermediate size are the most robust to shocks on the equity Risk Index and to rate Risk
Index concerning both equity and liquidity buffers, while the liquidity position of the
smallest banks has not improve and remains insufficient. Concerning the equity risk, we
find that it affects the largest banks almost exclusively. We also find that french banks are
among the most fragile for the recent period, displaying large shortfalls on both buffers
whatever the source of the shock.
We want to stress that the nature of fragility has changed since the last crisis: before
the crisis, the banks were mainly exposed to the equity risk, while their major fragility
come today from their massive exposure to the interest rate risk.
The latter finding is particularly important if one thinks of the impact that the end
of Quantitative Easing could have on the banking system. Indeed, by performing a stress
test with a joint increase in the level of the interest rate and in the interdependencies
between the equity and bond markets, we find that the portfolios of the biggest banks in
Europe would need e500 billions and e100 billions for the liquidity and equity buffers
respectively, which represent striking shortfalls if one notes that the shock to the rate is
rather small and already occured in our sample period.
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The structure of the paper continues as follows. In section 2 we present the economet-
ric methodology and the construction of the buffers from the short term balance sheet.
In Section 3 we present the data . Section 4 documents the results based on the three
identified dimensions (bank’s portfolio, dependencies and shocks). Section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 Econometric Methodology
In this section we present our econometric modeling by recalling first the principles of a
CVRF model and explaining then how simulations are run for the stress test exercises,
before turning to the measures of the equity and liquidity buffers deduced from the
balance sheet.
2.1.1 Model estimation
Sklar’s theorem (Sklar, 1959) states that any multivariate joint distribution of n random
variables X = (X1, ..., Xn) can be written in terms of univariate marginal distribution
functions F1(x1),...,Fn(xn) and a copula which describes the dependence structure be-
tween the variables:
F (x1, ..., xn) = C(F1(x1), ..., Fn(xn)) = C(u1, ..., un)) (1)
where F denotes the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the n variables and C(.)
is some appropriate (uniquely defined) n-dimensional copula which is a cumulative dis-
tribution function (cdf) with uniformly distributed marginals Ui = Fi(Xi) on [0,1].
Accordingly, modeling of margins and dependence can be separated. Moreover, for
an absolutely continuous F with strictly increasing, continuous marginal cdf Fi, we get
the joint density function f by differentiating (1),
f(x1, ..., xn) = c1:n(F1(x1), ..., Fn(xn)) · f1(x1) · · · fn(xn), (2)
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which is the product of the n-dimensional copula density c1:n(·) and the marginal densities
fi(·).
Finally, the n−dimensional density c1:n can be decomposed as a product of bi-variate
copulas. The decomposition is not unique. To help organize the possible factorization
of the joint density, Bedford and Cooke (2001, 2002) have introduced a graphical model
denoted the regular vine. Regular vines (R-vines) are a convenient graphical model to
hierarchically structure pair copula constructions. A special case of regular vines is the
canonical vine where certain variables play a leading role.
Figure 1 shows a canonical vine with five variables. From the figure, we observe that
the variable 1 at the root node is a key variable that plays a leading role in governing
interactions in the data set.
Figure 1: A five dimensional canonical vine tree
In the first tree, all nodes are associated with the X1, ..., X5 variables. For example,
the edge 12 corresponds to the copula c(F1(x1), F2(x2). In the second tree, the edge 23|1
denotes the copula c(F2|1(x2|x1), F3|1(x3|x1)). The following trees are built according to
the same rules. In what follows, the Xi variables are asset returns.
To get a CVFR model we have to combine a factorial structure to a C-vine. This
is achieved by imposing dependency constraints in the lines of Heinen and Valdesogo
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Table 1: Factorial dependence matrix M s
F1 F2 F3 F4 a1 a2 a3 a4
F1 1
F2 1 1
F3 1 0 1
F4 1 0 1 1
a1 1 1 0 0 1
a2 1 1 1 0 0 1
a3 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
a4 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
(2009) who build a CVMS (C-Vine Market-Sector) model to describe the dependence
structure between asset returns mainly driven by market and sectors. We assume that
asset returns share several common risk factors -possibly interconnected- which mainly
explain their dependence structure so that they are independent when taken conditionally
on the factors.
Generally speaking, for a set of conditioning variables, υ and two variables X, Y ,
assuming that X and Y are conditionally independent given υ, is equivalent to:
cxy|υ(Fx|υ(x|υ), Fy|υ(y|υ)) = 1. (3)
where cxy|υ denotes the copula describing the dependence structure of X and Y taken
conditionally on υ.
Thus combining a factorial structure with a C-vine reduces to specify a dependence
matrix M s with elements equal to 0, in case of independence and 1 otherwise as in table
1 for example.
Among the n = 8 assets associated with the previous table, we distinguish between
F -type assets which are Factors1 and a-type ones which refer to the other assets of
the database (stocks, bonds, currencies..). The random variables are the corresponding
returns, ri, i = 1, ..., 8. If the element ij of the matrix is equal to 1, the return of asset
aj (or of market factor MFj) is related to the return of asset ai (or common component
MFi), conditionally on the returns of any asset (or common component) preceding aj
1We refer to them as Factors when their dependencies are conditional and Indexes otherwise
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(e.g., rj−1,rj−2,...,r1). If this element is equal to 0, the pair is conditionally independent
and the density of the associated copula is equal to one.
Specifying the previous matrix M s allows us to impose any dependence structure
specified “a priori”. All diagonal entries are equal to 1 since each asset is obviously linked
with itself, but imposing that all elements of the first column are equal to 1 means that
the returns of all assets (including the ones of the common components F2, F3 and F4)
depend on the first Factor F1. We can impose conditional independence or dependence
between the Factors; here, elements M s(3,2) and M
s
(4,3) are respectively equal to 0 and
1, meaning that F2 and F3 are independent, conditionally on F1, while F4 and F3 are
dependent, conditionally on F1.
Moreover, each asset can share just one Factor as well as several ones: for example, a1
is only related to F2 conditionally on F1 while a3 is related to F3 and F4, conditionally on
F1. In the same way, assets can be dependent or independent on each other conditionally
on the Factors: for example, element M s(8,6) is equal to 1 which means that a2 is related
to a4 given the 4 Factors while M
s
(8,7) = 0 indicates that a3 and a4 are conditionally
independent. Moreover, for each pair of assets (i, j), such that M s(i,j) = 1, the dependence
is further characterized by one copula chosen among various bivariate copulas.
Once specified the dependence matrix, we proceed in two steps. First we estimate the
marginal distributions of the returns. Different approaches are possible. Here we retain
the empirical distributions. Then, according to:
Ui = Fi(Xi) (4)
for i = 1, ..., n, each return ri is transformed into a uniform “residual” ui by using the
empirical cumulative distribution functions Fi as in Meucci (2007).
In a second stage, we fit a Canonical Vine (C-Vine) copula structure to the uniform
residuals ui, i = 1, ..., n, and, more precisely, we fit bivariate copulas to all pairs of these
uniform residuals whilst taking into account the factorial dependence structure specified
by the matrix M s. The bivariate copulas are thus chosen from a set of copula families:
Gaussian, Student t, Clayton and Frank.
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2.1.2 Simulation
In the following we describe two types of simulations that allow us to perform stress
tests. To run the simulations, we proceed as follows. First, by using the different bivari-
ate copulas chosen at the estimation step and the corresponding estimated parameters,
we implement the algorithm described in (Aas et al., 2009) to get N samples from the n
dimensional canonical vine C for the next period, i.e. Uˆi,T+1 by taking into account the de-
pendence constraints imposed through the matrix M s. Then, the inverse empirical cumu-
lative distribution functions (F−1i ) provides a sample of returns, i.e. rˆi,T+1 = F
−1
i (uˆi,T+1)
for i = 1, ..., n.
For simulations under extreme shocks, we impose that the return of one particular
asset i among the n assets has an extreme behaviour by constraining the corresponding
uniform residual uˆi to belong to an extreme zone, for example uˆi ≤ 0.01; the extreme
shock thus concerns asset i and, by using the algorithm proposed in Brechmann et al.
(2013), we draw samples from the C copula conditionally on an extreme value of uˆi.
Since the dependence structure is supposed to be unaffected by the shock, a stress
situation for one asset impacts not only the assets whose returns are directly related to
the return of the stressed asset but also the other returns in an indirect way, by affecting
the key variable at the root node of the C-Vine (which is related to all returns). This
means that a sharp decrease in the return of one market factor (the stressed asset) can
cause the distress of a bank if the assets of the banks are positively related to the market
factor. Conversely, in the case where some assets are negatively related to the stressed
market factor, the bank can benefit from diversification effects and be less affected by
the shock than isolated assets.
2.2 Short term balance sheet
For a bank i at time t, the bank balance sheet is divided between short term, long term
assets and liabilities, and equity:
STAit + LTAit = STDit + LTDit +Wit (5)
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With STAit denoting the market value of short term assets, STDit, the market value
of short term liabilities, Wit, the market value of equity, LTAit the book value of long
term assets and LTDit the book value of long term liabilities for a bank with index i.
We define two buffers, one of equity Eqit and one of liquidity Liqit :
Eqit = Wit/(STAit + LTAit) (6)
Liqit = STAit/STDit (7)
The former is a leverage ratio, meaning a ratio between the equity of the bank and
its total assets. It indicates the solvability of the bank, its ability to withstands losses
on its operations. The latter is the ratio between its short term resources (STAit) and
its short term debt (STDit) and figures the ability of a bank to fulfill it’s short term
commitments.
We rely on Basel III requirements (BCBS , 2011) to set the prudential ratios banks
have to comply with. Contrary to Brownlees and Engle (2015), we set the capital re-
quirement to 3% as required for the leverage. Concerning our liquidity buffer Liqit, we
consider the Liquidity Coverage Ratio as defined in BCBS (2014), and set a 100% ratio.
Wit/(STAit + LTAit) ≥ 3% (8)
STAit/STDit ≥ 100% (9)
Then we generate a set of k short term shocks (Ck) to the bank’s balance sheet, which
spreads to the bank’s balance sheet composed of market assets or liabilities, namely Wit,
STAit and STDit. Since LTAit and LTDit are long term items (over 1 year), we assume
that they are not affected by those short term shocks, and that their value is kept constant
at this short term horizon. The expected values of our buffers affected by the shocks,
which appears through conditional expectations one period ahead:
Et(Wit+1|Ck)
Et(STAit+1|Ck) + LTAit) ≥ 3% (10)
10
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Et(STAit+1|Ck)
Et(STDit+1|Ck) ≥ 100% (11)
As a consequence of the shock, the bank may have to recapitalize if Et(Eqit+1|Ck) ≤
3% or to protect itself against the risk of illiquidity if Et(Liqit+ 1|Ck) ≤ 100%, either by
selling long term assets, or by decreasing its dependence on short term funding. We can
already notice that the equity and buffer and the liquidity buffer are connected through
Et(STAit+1|Ck) which has opposite effect (its increase reinforce Liqit but is detrimental
to Eqit).
3 Data
The sample period for data ranges from January 2005 to December 2014. It covers
several crises (the Great Recession and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis) but also less
volatile periods such as 2005-2006 or 2013-2014. We use 17 financial market series all
extracted from Bloomberg and the balance sheet of 35 banks from 11 countries extracted
from SNL (see Appendix 6.1).
3.1 Market data
We have cut down the various risks a bank is exposed to six as in Kahlert and Wagner
(2015), which we believe allow us to have an exhaustive and parsimonious view of banks’
risks. We associate a financial series to each of those Risk Indexes (Table 2).
Table 2: Risk Indexes
Market series Risk Index
Eurostoxx (TR) Equity
Bobl2 Interest Rate
Iboxx euro Sov Sovereign
Iboxx euro Corp Corporate
EUR-USD exchange rate Foreign exchange
DJUBS Commodity Commodities
The ranking of our Risk Indexes puts equity Risk Index in the first place instead of the
rate Risk Index, unlike Bruneau et al. (2015), since financial markets are primary drivers
11
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of risks contagion through the agents’ expectations (Cappiello and al., 2006). We also
add 11 series of national stock indexes to control for country specific risk (see Appendix
6.2).
All the data are extracted from Bloomberg. We work with the weekly returns (as of
Fridays) of the 17 market indexes. We report some descriptive statistics for the 6 Risk
Indexes in Table 33. We observe that the equity and commodity Risk Indexes are more
volatile than the other Risk Indexes. Positive kurtosis indicate that the distributions of
the six index returns have fat tails. The distributions of equity, Euro Corporate bond,
currency and commodity indexes are asymmetric, as indicated by the negative skewness,
and have longer left tails as indicated by the values of the minimal return and the kurtosis,
which means that extreme negative returns are relatively more frequent.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Eurostoxx Bobl
Iboxx
euro sov
Iboxx
euro Corp
EUR-USD
exchange
rate
DJUBS
Commodity
Min -22.22% -1.36% -2.07% -3.13% -5.69% -13.57%
Max 12.21% 1.62% 3.02% 2.03% 5.51% 6.48%
Mean 0.06% 0.05% 0.09% 0.08% -0.01% -0.02%
Median 0.37% 0.05% 0.12% 0.12% -0.02% 0.15%
Std. Dev. 0.14% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.06% 0.11%
Skewness -0.88 0.10 0.23 -0.61 -0.14 -0.86
Kurtosis 6.31 0.65 2.67 4.83 1.67 2.95
We also collect weekly returns of each bank’s stock on the same period (January 2005
to December 2014). Market value of banks are not a perfect substitute for the real book
value of capital of a bank as Tavolaro and Visnovsky (2014) points out, but allow us to
have direct and dynamic dependencies and is widely used as an imperfect substitute.
3.2 Balance sheet data
The banks of our panel are those that took part to the AQR and stress-test conducted
by the ECB in 2014 and are listed. There are 38 such banks as in Acharya and Steffen
3We tried alternative series such as ”World MSCI Index” the characterize the Equity risk or “Citi
Germany GBI 3-7 Yr Index” to account for the Rate risk without changing very much the dimension of
dependencies or shocks.
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(2014). We have continuous data for 354 of them (see Appendix 6.3). Our sample yields
for 40% of all the assets of Eurozone 5 monetary and financial institutions (Table 4). In
details, our sample ranges from 89% do 6% of national MFIs total assets. Despite the
fact that Italian banks yields for almost one third of our sample in term of number of
banks, it is the French banking system that trusts the bigger share with 35% (next comes
Germany at 20% and then Italy and Spain at 15%).
Table 4: Percentage of country banking system total assets of the sampled banks, and
number of banks in the sample in brackets
Whole Sample
(35 banks)
Austria (1) Belgium (2) Cyprus (1) France (3) Germany (3)
Average 41% 21% 67% 7% 60% 31%
Min 37% (2005) 19% (2008) 45% (2014) 6% (2010) 58% (2005) 22% (2005)
Max 43% (2008) 23% (2006) 79% (2010) 9% (2005) 63% (2008) 36% (2008)
Greece (4) Ireland (2) Italy (10) Malta (2) Portugal (2) Spain (5)
Average 69% 22% 56% 26% 27% 61%
Min 60% (2005) 20% (2010) 51% (2013) 24% (2010) 24% (2013) 54% (2008)
Max 89% (2014) 25% (2013) 62% (2007) 28% (2007) 30% (2005) 77% (2014)
Using SNL data base, we have extracted detailed balance sheet information for the
35 banks in our sample, from 2005 to 2014. We build truncated balance sheet, focusing
on short term items on the asset side and and the liability side. We consider that an
asset can be labeled as short term if it is highly liquid or at least can be related to a
financial market where it can be sell in case of assets fire sales (AFS). On the liability side,
we took all the items that can be redeemed before one year or those that are linked to
the wholesale funding, which is considered to be highly unstable (Babihuga and Spaltro,
2014). We decompose each short term balance sheet into five items: non-trading, trading
equity, trading rate, trading commodities, trading forex (Table 5). The last four are
linked to Risk Indexes presented before. In the non-trading short term assets we include
those that are the most liquid. Concerning the trading assets, we take into account only
those that are available for sale or hold for trading. We also add all the corresponding
derivatives since the vast majority of them are labeled as trading securities. Loans are
4We couldn’t take in account BP, VBPS and LBK because of a lack of continuous data on their
balance sheet or share
5Cyprus and Malta entered the Eurozone in 2008, we made the calculations accordingly
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not taken into account since they are not liquid enough to be part of short term assets.
On the liability side, using data from SNL we have estimated that an average of 10% of
senior and subordinated debt matures each year and as a consequence can be considered
as short term debt. All trading liabilities are negative positions in derivatives, which are
treated as short term debt as they are commitments which can become harder to fulfill
in case of an episode of AFS. Finally we use market value of equity in the short term
balance sheet.
Table 5: Short term balance sheet
Non-trading short term assets
Cash and Balances with Central Banks
Net Loans to Banks
Trading assets Equity
Trading assets Rate
Trading assets Commodities
Trading assets Forex
Total Short Term Assets
Non-trading short term liabilities
Deposits Maturing in less than 3 months
Total Deposits from Banks
Memo: Repurchase Agreements Not in Deposits
Wholesale Debt maturing less than 1 year (Senior and Subordinated)
Securities Sold not yet repurchased
Trading liabilities Equity
Trading liabilities Rate
Trading liabilities Commodities
Trading liabilities Forex
Total Short Term Debt
Market Value of Equity
We then compile a portfolio of those five items for each banks. The Figure 2 shows
the aggregate portfolio of the whole sample break down into the five categories. We can
point out that non-trading item is larger in the liability side than the asset side, and on
the contrary trading items are more important on the asset side.
Following the methodology presented above, we construct the two buffers of liquidity
and equity for each banks of the sample. Figure 3 shows the aggregate buffers for the
whole sample. We see that the buffers started to decline in 2007 the year the crisis started
14
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.90
Figure 2: Aggregate banks’ short term portfolio according to Market Factors linkage
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Trading Equity Trading Rate Trading Commodity Trading Forex non-trading STA
(a) Short term assets
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(b) Short term debt
for the banking sector. The two buffers went far below the regulatory equivalent level
(100% for the liquidity buffer and 3% for the equity buffer) after 2008, only going above
after 2013. This Figure shows also the large effort the banking sector did after the crisis
to deal with its short term funding issues and restore its liquidity. Nevertheless Figure
2 is a average of the whole sample hiding very disparate situation. In our sample, the
liquidity buffer has a standard deviation of 46% 6, and the equity buffer, a standard
deviation of 6% 7.
Figure 3: Buffers for the aggregate sample
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6with a maximum of 400% for CRG in 2009 and a minimum of 7% for TPEIR in 2013
7with a minimum of 0.02% for Dexia in 2014 and a maximum of 50% for ALBK in 2013
15
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.90
4 Results
Following the three dimensions of our approach (portfolio, dependencies and shocks),
we present our results in the three subsequent subsections as follows: first, we examine
the evolution of the portfolio diversification achieved by the banks over the period of
our study, then the changes in the dependencies between the balance sheets items of the
banks and our Risk Factors over our sample (2005-2014), and finally, the impact of shocks
on our Risk Indexes on the buffers of banks of our panel. We introduce our results on a
country level and according to bank size.
4.1 Portfolio diversification
Figure 2 shows how the weights of the short term assets and the debt in the portfolios of
the banks have evolved over time between 2005 and 2014. A clear change corresponds to
the decrease in the part of the equity related trading instruments, on both asset or liability
sides, and to a slight increase in rate related instruments. This portfolio rebalancing can
be explained by a flight to quality or liquidity (Beber et al., 2009) due to the crises in 2007
and in 2010. Banks have also slightly increased the part of non-trading short term assets.
This can be explained by the liquidity injection from the ECB’s operations (LTRO, ...).
Banks have therefore operated a portfolio rebalancing in order to reduce their exposi-
tion to the most risky assets during the crises (assets which are strongly linked with the
equity Risk Index) so as to benefit from diversification effects.
4.2 Dependence analysis
The bivariate copulas are chosen from a set of families: Gaussian, Student-t, Clayton,
Frank. Note that the Gaussian and Frank copulas do not allow for any tail dependen-
cies contrary to the Student and Clayton ones which allow for symmetric and lower tail
dependencies respectively. We report the results about the estimations8 of the bivariate
copulas between different assets in Table 6. We find evidences of a broad tail depen-
8Copulas are chosen according to the best fit to data based on the BIC.
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dence between our series since copula specifications with tail dependence (Student-t and
Clayton) have been estimated as the best fit for about 40% of the total of 397 bivariate
copulas.
Table 6: Estimation: Copula families
Copula name Tail dependence Frequency
Student-t Yes 29%
Clayton Yes 11%
Gaussian No 28%
Frank No 31%
The dependence matrix displayed in Table 7 corresponds to the retained CVine struc-
ture for the Risk Factors9 we defined previously (Section 3.1) and gives conditional
Kendall’s tau except for the first column which reports unconditional Kendall’s tau.
Indeed, from the second column, the Kendall’s tau are calculated conditionally on the
returns of the assets of the previous columns. For example, -0.09 is the unconditional
Kendall’s tau between Eurostoxx and Iboxx Euro Sovereign while 0.51 is the conditional
Kendall’s tau between the returns of Bobl and Iboxx Euro Sovereign given the return of
Eurostoxx.
We can distinguish between a relatively safe group of Risk Factors including Bobl
and Iboxx euro Sovereign indexes which are negatively related to Eurostoxx and strongly
related together, and a riskier group of Risk Factors composed of other indexes which
have a positive link with Eurostoxx. According to this property which could be explained
by the “flight to quality” phenomenon, the bank’s portfolio can potentially benefit from
diversification effects.
In appendix, Table 12 (resp. Table 14) gives the unconditional (resp. conditional)
Kendall’s tau between the market indexes and between the market indexes and banks. In
addition, Table 13 (resp. Table 15) gives the unconditional (resp. conditional) Kendall’s
tau between banks stock returns located in the same country.
Table 14 shows that banks’ stock returns are strongly related to the return of the global
9We refer here to factors instead of indexes, since their dependence is conditional to previous depen-
dencies (see Section 2.1.1)
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Table 7: Estimation: CVine Kendall’s tau between Risk factors
Eurostoxx Bobl
Iboxx
euro sov
Iboxx
euro Corp
EUR-USD
exchange
rate
DJUBS
Commodity
Eurostoxx 1
Bobl -0.30 1
euro sov -0.09 0.51 1
euro Corp -0.07 0.58 0.32 1
EUR-USD 0.15 -0.10 0.06 0.02 1
Commodity 0.20 -0.07 -0.05 0.07 0.27 1
equity Risk Factor but much less related to other indexes. As to the conditional links
between the bank stocks and the national stock indexes, we find that some country stock
indexes are less linked to their bank stocks (e.g. FR and DE) than others (e.g. IT and ES)
when taken conditionally on the previous Risk Factor. This is due to the relatively high
representation of French and German index in the Eurostoxx which can also be testified by
the relatively high dependencies between Eurostoxx and French/German equity indexes
(respectively 0.87 and 0.8). Once dependencies are estimated conditionally on Eurostoxx
(Table 14), country specific indexes generally do not explain much of the additional
systematic effects on the 5 other Risk Factors. This means that they may rather have
a stronger additional explanatory power to account for the country specific links among
bank equities from the same country.
By comparing Table 13 and 15, we notice that the dependencies between equity returns
of banks located in the same country significantly decrease once conditioning on the
market indexes, with an exception for the French and German banks10. The global
indexes and the country specific stock indexes generally capture the quasi total part of
the links between equity returns of banks from a same country11. Modest12 remaining
dependence between banks of our sample, giving us confidence that the structure of
10These relative strong ”residual” dependencies can be explained by a more internationalized dimen-
sion, making them less linked to their home country stock market. Another explanation can come from
another hidden factor.
11It is worth noting that the country specific stock indexes play a major role in capturing these links.
Indeed, in a CVine structure without these indexes, the conditional Kendall’s tau remain quite high for
banks located in a same country (Italy, Spain, ...) (Table Table 13). Detailed results are available upon
request.
12In the case where banks’ equity returns still display residual links after conditioning on the returns
of the different indexes, we relax the conditional independence constraint in our CVRF model.
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dependence between our Risk Factors, national indexes and banks is accurate.
Figure 4: Evolution of the dependencies (Kendall’s tau)
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We compute the dependencies between our Factors using a two years rolling window
with a one year overlapping (Figure 4), in order to assess the dynamics of the dependen-
cies. The links appear to be different during critical periods as 2007-2008 compare to
more quiet periods as 2005-2006. For example the dependence between stock and bond
markets become even more negative in the turmoil periods likely due to the heightened
investors’ risk aversion. Similarly the commodity Risk Factor and the foreign exchange
Risk Factor appear to be more tightly related to the equity Risk Factor during theses
periods, which means that the diversification benefits from these assets are likely to be
reduced under tail events. Regarding Euro sovereign bonds, investors seem to have con-
sidered them as safe-haven assets during the 2007-2008 crisis. Moreover the increasing
trend in their dependence with the equity Risk Factor after the Eurozone debt crisis could
indicate a rising sovereign credit risk in the Eurozone. One even observes that Eurostoxx
and Iboxx Euro Sovereign indexes become positively interconnected after 2011.
4.3 Effects of shocks
We simulate shocks only for the first two Risk Indexes, for the sake of simplicity since
they already represent the major source of risks and concern directly 75% of banks’ short
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term balance sheet (see Table 5). Using a rolling window of two years with a one year
overlapping, we design shocks with a magnitude corresponding to the 1% worse obser-
vation over a week, then we transpose it to a month horizon13 (as a 4 weeks continuous
depreciation at the weekly rate simulated). We observe in the Table 8, that theses shocks
materialize as drops which are more severe for the equity Risk Index than for the rate
Risk Index. Moreover the major draw downs happen in the heart of the 2007-2009 crisis
and during the European debt crisis (2010-2011). The complete set of shocks is displayed
in Appendix 6.5.
Table 8: Magnitude of shocks on Risk Indexes over a week, depending on the source of
the shock
Equity (Shock
at 1%)
Rate Equity
Rate (Shock at
1%)
2005-2006 -3,3% 0,1% 0,7% -0,8%
2006-2007 -4,5% 0,2% 1,4% -0,6%
2007-2008 -11,8% 0,5% 2,3% -1,1%
2008-2009 -11,8% 0,6% 3,1% -1,2%
2009-2010 -9,7% 0,5% 3,2% -0,9%
2010-2011 -11,1% 1,0% 5,5% -1,0%
2011-2012 -6,9% 1,0% 5,4% -1,3%
2012-2013 -4,8% 0,3% 1,8% -1,1%
2013-2014 -4,5% 0,1% 0,9% -1,0%
Using the methodology described in Section 2, we examine the potential shortfalls
the banks of our panel would suffer due to their portfolio composition, the dynamic
dependencies and the source of the shock as displayed in Table 8. Unlike Brownlees and
Engle (2015) 14, we use a 3% constraint for the equity buffer since our equity buffer relates
more to a leverage buffer than to the risk weighted assets. For the liquidity buffer we
relates to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio defined by the Basel commitee (BCBS , 2014) as
the ratio between its liquid assets and its cash outflows on a 30 days period.
For the total shortfalls of our sample, either for a shock to equity Risk Index (5a) or
to the rate Risk Index (5b), the shortfalls on the liquidity buffer are massive for the whole
period, with a low in 2005 before the crisis at e300 billions. We can distinguish 3 periods:
13We use a month horizon for our shock because we relate to LCR which has a 30 days horizon
14They use a 8% constraint
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until 2008 shortfalls on the liquidity buffers increase to a high at e700 billion, which
relates to the liquidity disruption banks have experienced in the peak of the subprime
crisis. Liquidity position starts to improve until the second crisis of the European debt
starting in 2010 leading to a new drop, because of the deterioration of government bonds.
Finally bank’s liquidity shortfall recedes since 2011, but is still above e400 billions.
The position of the equity buffer displays the same 3 periods, with a peak in 2008 at
e300 billions shortfalls in case of a shock on the equity Risk Index (Figure 5a). Quite
surprisingly also it seems to increase in 2014 from 2013, despite a stable magnitude of
shock (Table 8), for both a shock to the equity Risk Index or the rate Risk Index.
Figure 5: Total shortfalls on bank’s buffers after a shock
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In order to identify sources of banks’ fragility we analyze banks’ shortfalls according
to the country of the bank and to its size (see Appendix 6.3).
We have sorted banks into 3 unbalanced categories according to their size. The first
one, with banks than have a total asset in 2014 superior to e1000 billions, is composed
of 5 banks. The second one, with 4 banks, regroups those whose assets are between e500
billions and e1000 billions. The last one includes 26 banks with a total asset less than
e500 billions.
The bigger banks have the higher shortfalls on the equity buffer (Figure 6), but the
shortfalls have recede since 2008 and 2011 where they had their highest level. Nevertheless
bigger banks seem to undergo a new deterioration of their shortfalls in equity buffer as
we saw before. This can come from the recent losses banks have suffered due to fines or
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poor income (Arnould and Dehmej, 2015). Large and medium banks suffered liquidity
shortfalls (Figure 7) between 2008 and 2011. Finally, the smallest banks have kept better
liquidity positions compared to the other banks but experience a continuous decline in
these positions over the period.
If we compare our results (see Appendix 6.6 for the ranking of equity shortfalls) to the
ones obtained with the SRIRSK Brownlees and Engle (2015), we note that our results
are globally similar to the ones of the SRISK, especially concerning the ranking for the
equity shortfalls with the most fragile banks being the biggest ones, namely BNP Paribas,
Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale, Deutsche Bank and Cre´dit Agrigole.
Figure 6: Shortfalls on the equity buffer by banks according to bank size
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(a) shock on the stock index
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Figure 7: Shortfalls on the liquidity buffer by banks according to bank size
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(b) Shock on the rate index
The banks of our panel only represent a part of the corresponding national banking
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system, with a part which varies from 7% to 69% (Table 4). Accordingly, our figures
doesn’t represent the whole banking system of each country but at least the situation of
the biggest banks. France and Germany are the countries with the highest shortfalls on
the equity buffer (Figure 8) during the climax of the crisis. These shortfalls decreased
but rose again in 2014 as we saw before. Since the French and German banking systems
comprise the biggest banks of the Eurozone (Annexe 6.3), the causes are those explained
just before. All the other banks from the other countries of our sample have much
moderate shortfalls, confirming the fact that bigger banks are much more exposed to a
shortfall in the equity. Conclusions are very different on the liquidity side. Greek banks
face a tough situation, with a continuous increase of their liquidity shortfalls 15. Belgium
also has high shortfalls on its liquidity buffer, but this can be explained by the unsolved
difficulties of the Dexia bank as Belgium is represented by only two banks. In Germany,
we observe that shortfalls have continuously recede after a high in 2007. France on the
contrary seems to undergo a recent increase of its liquidity shortfalls.
Figure 8: Shortfalls on the equity buffer by banks according to countries
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15Our Greek sample represents 90% of the whole national banking system in 2014, showing how
dramatic the situation is.
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Figure 9: Shortfalls on the liquidity buffer by banks according to countries
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Our results are slightly different from those of the Comprehensive Assessment of 2014
of the ECB (ECB, 2014). Indeed, the ECB’s stress test pointed out mainly Italians and
Greek banks. Our results don’t display major fragilities for Italian banks because their
fragility essentially comes from non performing loans, which we don’t take in account in
our approach. On the other hand we show, as the ECB, that Greek banks are extremely
fragile on their liquidity buffer and suffer a continuous depreciation since 2006 (Figure
9).
The liquidity and equity buffers are reputed to be interlinked Pierret (2015). We
confirm this property and explain it mainly by the joint exposition to the same shocks.
Indeed, both buffers are composed of similar asset’s class (for example equities enter both
buffers, even if those are different shares) which are exposed to the corresponding Risk
Indexes which are interrelated as we have shown in Section 4.2.
4.4 Stress-testing the next crisis
In this section, we propose to show what would be the consequences of a positive depen-
dence between equity and bonds. Rankin and Shad Idil (2014) shows that it is common
for the correlation between bonds and equity to be negative. Hence, bonds have been
largely used as hedge for the equity risk. We have shown in the section 4.1 that our sam-
ple of banks operated a portfolio rebalancing, increasing their position on bonds markets
24
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.90
and decreasing their position on the equity market.
But the negative correlation between bonds and equity can reverse. Campbell et al.
(2013) shows that inflation risk can prompt a positive correlation between equity and
nominal bond returns during high unexpected inflation periods. Indeed, the correlation
between bonds and equity has reversed in Europe since the end of 2014. The Figure 4
shows the start of this reversal.
We consider the case of a sudden increase in the interest rates or, equivalently, on a
negative shock to the return of the rate Risk Index. We take the worst return rate of
the Bobl index observed over the whole period, that is −1.36% (See Table 3). Such a
value is not unrealistic if one notes that German 10-year government bonds were yielding
0.64% in May 2015 although they were yielding just 0.08% in mid-April 2015, well above
the level observed in January before the ECB announced its bond buying program such
as the Quantitative Easing. Moreover the current low liquidity context in the Euro may
exacerbate the rise in yields as recently observed. “Ultra-loose central bank monetary
policy has tended to encourage investor herding behaviour and the ECBs large asset
purchase programme may have also created a shortage of bond supply, exacerbating
liquidity problems and increasing the vulnerability of European government bond markets
in a correction” as quoted by Seetharamdoo (2015).
At the same time, we suppose that the equity and bond Risk Indexes are positively
related to each other according to a value of the Kendall’s tau equal to 0.30, while the
Kendall’s tau between the returns of the equity Risk Index and the sovereign Risk Index
is supposed to be equal to 0.10. These two values of Kendall’s tau correspond to the
opposite values of the Kendall’s tau’s estimates reported in Table 7. They can also be
justified by remarking that the latter Kendall’s tau of 0.10 is indeed observed in 2013-
2014 as displayed by Figure 4, whilst the former Kendall’s tau of 0.30 can be obtained by
extrapolating the trend observed from 2011 at a two or three-year horizon. Moreover it is
worth noting that a Kendall’s tau of 0.30 corresponds to a standard correlation coefficient
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equal to 0.5 for the associated copula 16, which is not unrealistic as it has been observed
in the US case during the 90’s17
Figure 10: Shortfalls on the equity buffer by banks
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Figure 11: Shortfalls on the liquity buffer by banks
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Our scenario leads to a monthly shock of -1,4% on the rate Risk Index and of -
6,3% on the equity Risk Index. The shortfalls only display small increases on the equity
and the liquidity buffers in 2014, except for France and the biggest banks (Figures 10
and 11). However, removing the portfolio diversification opportunities and including the
16The Kendall’s τ is related to the correlation coefficient ρ according to:
τ =
2
pi
arcin(ρ) (12)
17indeed one can find a correlation of about -0.5 between the monthly changes in 10-year government
bond yields and SP 500 around 1990 as displayed in a study by Rankin and Shad Idil (2014) who refer
to Andersson et al. (2008) to explain that negative stock-bond correlation.
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worse cases for both equity and bonds, the scenario leads to a significant global fragility
situation.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a methodology to assess the short term fragility of the
largest European banks through their equity and liquidity buffers. We find that Bank’s
solvability and liquidity fragility are indeed interconnected as their are composed of sim-
ilar assets which are all exposed to shocks to the main market indexes. More precisely,
concerning the liquidity risk, we observe that the aggregate liquidity position has im-
proved during the considered the period (2005-2014). Moreover the biggest banks appear
to be the most exposed to the equity risk, while the banks of intermediate size are today
the most resilient in case of shocks to equity or bond indexes either concerning liquidity
or equity risks.
But our main finding is that the nature of fragility has changed since the last crisis:
before the crisis, the banks were mainly exposed to the equity risk, while their major
fragility comes today from their exposure to the interest rate risk. We have performed
a stress test which illustrates the main risk of the banking system today. By simulating
a joint increase in the level of the interest rate and in the interdependencies between
the equity and bond markets, we find that the portfolios of the biggest banks in Europe
would experience very severe shortfalls for both buffers.
A regulator should should pay utmost attention to the the case where correlations be-
tween bonds and equities start to become positive, since a shock with this configuration
can be much more destructive due to the loss of diversification opportunities. An inter-
esting topic could be to reinforce the Macro-prudential policies by specifying the weights
of the assets composing the liquidity buffer dynamics as functions of the dependence
structure between the main assets.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Balance sheet items and SNL keys
Table 9: Balance sheet items and SNL keys
Balance sheet item SNL Keys
ASSETS
Cash and Balances with Central Banks (Reported) 246025
Net Loans to Banks (Reported) 224934
Total Gross Loans (Reported) 132210
Total Assets (Reported) 132264
Debt Instruments Held for Trading (Reported) 224995
Equity Instruments Held for Trading (Reported) 224996
Debt Instruments Held at Fair Value (Reported) 225004
Equity Instruments Held at Fair Value (Reported) 225005
Debt Instruments Available for Sale (Reported) 225012
Equity Instruments Available for Sale (Reported) 225013
Interest Rate Derivative Assets (Reported) 225293
Positive Replacement: Credit Derivative (Reported) 225294
Positive Replacement: Equity Derivative (Reported) 225295
Positive Replacement: Foreign Exchange Derivative (Reported) 225296
Positive Replacement: Commodity Derivative (Reported) 225297
Positive Replacement: Other Derivative (Reported) 225298
Negative Replacement: Interest Rate Derivative (Reported) 225300
Negative Replacement: Credit Derivative (Reported) 225301
Negative Replacement: Equity Derivative (Reported) 225302
Negative Replacement: Foreign Exchange Derivative (Reported) 225303
Negative Replacement: Commodity Derivative (Reported) 225304
Negative Replacement: Other Derivative (Reported) 225305
LIABILITIES
Deposits from Cust Held at Amortized Cost (Reported) 224952
Total Deposits from Banks (Reported) 224953
Senior Debt (Reported) 132311
Total Subordinated Debt (Reported) 132314
Securities Sold, not yet Purchased (Reported) 132321
Total Liabilities (Reported) 132367
Memo: Repurchase Agreements Not in Deposits (Reported) 224969
Memo: Deposits from Central Banks (Reported) 224970
Memo: Deposits from non-Central Banks (Reported) 224971
Deposits Maturing in less than 3 months (Reported) 225134
Total Equity (Reported) 132385
Common Shares Outstanding (actual) 243477
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6.2 Country stock market indexes
Table 10: Country stock market indexes
Country name Country code Stock market index
Austria AT ATX Index
Belgium BE BEL20 Index
Cyprus CY CYSMMAPA Index
France FR CAC Index
Germany DE DAX Index
Greece EL ASE Index
Ireland IE ISEQ Index
Italy IT FTSEMIB Index
Malta MT MALTEX Index
Portugal PT PSI20 Index
Spain ES IBEX Index
32
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.90
6.3 Bank Sample
Table 11: Bank Sample
Country
name
Bank
Ticker
Name
Total Assets in
201418 (billion
Eur)
Austria EBS Erste Group Bank AG 196
Belgium KBC KBC 245
DEXB Dexia SA 247
Cyprus HB Hellenic Bank Public Company Limited 8
France BNP BNP Paribas SA 2078
ACA Cre´dit Agricole SA 1589
GLE Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale SA 1308
Germany DBK Deutsche Bank AG 1709
CBK Commerzbank AG 558
ARL Aareal Bank AG 50
Greece ETE National Bank of Greece SA 115
TPEIR Piraeus Bank SA 89
ALPHA Alpha Bank AE 73
EUROB Eurobank Ergasias SA 76
Ireland BKIR Bank of Ireland 130
ALBK Allied Irish Banks PLC 107
Italy UCG UniCredit SpA 844
ISP Intesa Sanpaolo SpA 646
BMPS Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA 183
UBI Unione di Banche Italiane SCpA 122
MB Mediobanca - Banca di Credito Finanziario SpA 70
BPE Banca popolare dell’Emilia Romagna SC 61
PMI Banca Popolare di Milano Scarl 48
CRG Banca Carige SpA - Cassa di Risparmio di Genova e Imperia 38
BPSO Banca Popolare di Sondrio SCpA 36
CE Credito Emiliano SpA 35
Malta BOV Bank of Valletta Plc 8
HSB HSBC Bank Malta Plc 7
Portugal BCP Banco Comercial Portugus SA 76
BPI Banco BPI SA 43
Spain SAN Banco Santander SA 1266
BBVA Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, SA 632
SAB Banco de Sabadell, SA 163
POP Banco Popular Espaol SA 161
BKT Bankinter SA 57
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6.4 Kendall’s tau for all assets
Table 12: Unconditional Kendall’s tau between market factors and other indexes
Eurostoxx Bobl
Euro
Sov.
Euro
Corp.
EUR-
USD
Commo. AT BE CY FR DE EL IE IT MT PT ES
Eurostoxx 1
Bobl -0.29 1
Euro Sov. -0.09 0.52 1
Euro Corp. -0.07 0.57 0.52 1
EUR-USD 0.12 -0.14 -0.03 -0.07 1
Commo. 0.19 -0.15 -0.10 -0.05 0.31 1
AT 0.60 -0.28 -0.11 -0.06 0.14 0.24 1
BE 0.71 -0.27 -0.07 -0.07 0.10 0.17 - 1
CY 0.31 -0.20 -0.06 -0.04 0.13 0.10 - - 1
FR 0.87 -0.29 -0.11 -0.07 0.12 0.21 - - - 1
DE 0.81 -0.26 -0.12 -0.06 0.10 0.19 - - - - 1
EL 0.42 -0.23 -0.06 -0.03 0.14 0.13 - - - - - 1
IE 0.56 -0.20 -0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.11 - - - - - - 1
IT 0.75 -0.29 -0.06 -0.06 0.13 0.17 - - - - - - - 1
MT 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.05 - - - - - - - - 1
PT 0.52 -0.24 -0.04 -0.03 0.10 0.15 - - - - - - - - - 1
ES 0.73 -0.28 -0.04 -0.07 0.15 0.17 - - - - - - - - - - 1
EBS 0.51 -0.26 -0.08 -0.09 0.13 0.17 0.65 - - - - - - - - - -
KBC 0.55 -0.24 -0.01 -0.05 0.10 0.11 - 0.55 - - - - - - - - -
DEXB 0.31 -0.17 0.00 -0.05 0.05 0.08 - 0.37 - - - - - - - - -
HB 0.26 -0.15 -0.06 -0.02 0.08 0.08 - - 0.57 - - - - - - - -
BNP 0.61 -0.30 -0.08 -0.11 0.10 0.14 - - - 0.62 - - - - - - -
ACA 0.55 -0.24 -0.03 -0.06 0.10 0.13 - - - 0.54 - - - - - - -
GLE 0.62 -0.25 -0.04 -0.06 0.13 0.14 - - - 0.61 - - - - - - -
DBK 0.62 -0.26 -0.06 -0.06 0.12 0.13 - - - - 0.57 - - - - - -
CBK 0.49 -0.23 -0.05 -0.06 0.12 0.13 - - - - 0.46 - - - - - -
ARL 0.47 -0.17 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.14 - - - - 0.44 - - - - - -
ETE 0.35 -0.17 -0.04 -0.03 0.10 0.09 - - - - - 0.63 - - - - -
TPEIR 0.34 -0.18 -0.05 -0.05 0.11 0.11 - - - - - 0.58 - - - - -
ALPHA 0.32 -0.18 -0.05 -0.06 0.08 0.09 - - - - - 0.58 - - - - -
EUROB 0.29 -0.21 -0.08 -0.08 0.11 0.11 - - - - - 0.55 - - - - -
BKIR 0.40 -0.18 -0.01 -0.05 0.11 0.11 - - - - - - 0.51 - - - -
ALBK 0.36 -0.20 -0.06 -0.06 0.07 0.10 - - - - - - 0.43 - - - -
UCG 0.56 -0.29 -0.06 -0.09 0.12 0.12 - - - - - - - 0.69 - - -
ISP 0.57 -0.23 -0.01 -0.07 0.12 0.13 - - - - - - - 0.68 - - -
BMPS 0.39 -0.19 -0.01 -0.04 0.10 0.11 - - - - - - - 0.47 - - -
UBI 0.44 -0.24 -0.04 -0.09 0.09 0.08 - - - - - - - 0.56 - - -
MB 0.47 -0.17 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.10 - - - - - - - 0.58 - - -
BPE 0.39 -0.17 0.02 -0.03 0.09 0.08 - - - - - - - 0.47 - - -
PMI 0.41 -0.18 0.04 -0.03 0.11 0.09 - - - - - - - 0.52 - - -
CRG 0.33 -0.18 -0.02 -0.06 0.12 0.12 - - - - - - - 0.40 - - -
BPSO 0.35 -0.17 0.01 -0.03 0.09 0.10 - - - - - - - 0.43 - - -
CE 0.45 -0.22 -0.02 -0.05 0.12 0.09 - - - - - - - 0.52 - - -
BOV 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.03 - - - - - - - - 0.46 - -
HSB 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 - - - - - - - - 0.27 - -
BCP 0.33 -0.22 -0.01 -0.04 0.08 0.06 - - - - - - - - - 0.50 -
BPI 0.38 -0.20 -0.01 -0.05 0.10 0.09 - - - - - - - - - 0.51 -
SAN 0.63 -0.26 -0.02 -0.07 0.14 0.13 - - - - - - - - - - 0.75
BBVA 0.63 -0.26 -0.03 -0.07 0.14 0.13 - - - - - - - - - - 0.75
SAB 0.42 -0.21 -0.02 -0.07 0.12 0.07 - - - - - - - - - - 0.52
POP 0.47 -0.24 -0.04 -0.10 0.11 0.09 - - - - - - - - - - 0.58
BKT 0.47 -0.22 -0.02 -0.09 0.10 0.05 - - - - - - - - - - 0.57
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Table 13: Unconditional Kendall’s tau between banks
Country Banks
Austria EBS
Belgium KBC DEXB
KBC 1
DEXB 0.32 1
Cyprus HB
France BNP ACA GLE
BNP 1
ACA 0.61 1
GLE 0.65 0.61 1
Germany DBK CBK ARL
DBK 1
CBK 0.50 1
ARL 0.44 0.38 1
Greece ETE TPEIR ALPHA EUROB
ETE 1
TPEIR 0.58 1
ALPHA 0.56 0.56 1
EUROB 0.55 0.53 0.57 1
Ireland BKIR ALBK
BKIR 1
ALBK 0.45 1
Italy UCG ISP BMPS UBI MB BPE PMI CRG BPSO CE
UCG 1
ISP 0.62 1
BMPS 0.45 0.44 1
UBI 0.52 0.55 0.47 1
MB 0.50 0.51 0.38 0.48 1
BPE 0.44 0.43 0.36 0.45 0.40 1
PMI 0.49 0.50 0.42 0.48 0.47 0.46 1
CRG 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.31 0.34 1
BPSO 0.39 0.40 0.36 0.42 0.39 0.45 0.40 0.34 1
CE 0.46 0.49 0.39 0.47 0.43 0.39 0.41 0.35 0.40 1
Malta BOV HSB
BOV 1
HSB 0.13 1
Portugal BCP BPI
BCP 1
BPI 0.46 1
Spain SAN BBVA SAB POP BKT
SAN 1
BBVA 0.71 1
SAB 0.49 0.51 1
POP 0.55 0.57 0.56 1
BKT 0.52 0.56 0.50 0.55 1
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Table 14: Kendall’s tau between market factors and other indexes under CVine structure
Eurostoxx Bobl
Euro
Sov.
Euro
Corp.
EUR-
USD
Commo. AT BE CY FR DE EL IE IT MT PT ES
Eurostoxx 1
Bobl -0.30 1
Euro Sov. -0.09 0.51 1
Euro Corp. -0.07 0.58 0.32 1
EUR-USD 0.15 -0.10 0.06 0.02 1
Commo. 0.20 -0.07 -0.05 0.07 0.27 1
AT 0.60 -0.08 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.13 1
BE 0.70 -0.03 0.06 0.03 -0.05 -0.02 - 1
CY 0.30 -0.10 0.08 0.08 0.07 -0.03 - - 1
FR 0.87 -0.05 -0.07 0.03 -0.02 0.09 - - - 1
DE 0.80 0.05 -0.17 0.05 -0.01 0.03 - - - - 1
EL 0.42 -0.08 0.10 0.09 0.06 -0.03 - - - - - 1
IE 0.54 0.04 -0.02 0.06 -0.11 -0.02 - - - - - - 1
IT 0.75 -0.04 0.17 0.04 0.03 -0.03 - - - - - - - 1
MT 0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.06 - - - - - - - - 1
PT 0.52 -0.05 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.03 - - - - - - - - - 1
ES 0.72 -0.04 0.19 -0.01 0.07 -0.06 - - - - - - - - - - 1
EBS 0.51 -0.08 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.46 - - - - - - - - - -
KBC 0.55 -0.04 0.18 0.00 0.01 -0.06 - 0.21 - - - - - - - - -
DEXB 0.31 -0.05 0.09 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 - 0.22 - - - - - - - - -
HB 0.26 -0.05 0.02 0.10 0.03 -0.01 - - 0.50 - - - - - - - -
BNP 0.61 -0.11 0.10 -0.02 0.01 -0.05 - - - 0.14 - - - - - - -
ACA 0.55 -0.05 0.11 0.00 0.01 -0.05 - - - 0.08 - - - - - - -
GLE 0.61 -0.05 0.13 0.03 0.05 -0.06 - - - 0.07 - - - - - - -
DBK 0.62 -0.03 0.07 0.02 0.02 -0.07 - - - - 0.07 - - - - - -
CBK 0.49 -0.06 0.10 0.03 0.03 -0.01 - - - - 0.03 - - - - - -
ARL 0.48 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.00 - - - - 0.01 - - - - - -
ETE 0.34 -0.03 0.06 0.03 0.04 -0.03 - - - - - 0.54 - - - - -
TPEIR 0.35 -0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.01 - - - - - 0.48 - - - - -
ALPHA 0.33 -0.06 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.01 - - - - - 0.47 - - - - -
EUROB 0.30 -0.11 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.03 - - - - - 0.45 - - - - -
BKIR 0.40 -0.03 0.11 0.02 0.04 -0.01 - - - - - - 0.34 - - - -
ALBK 0.36 -0.06 0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 - - - - - - 0.27 - - - -
UCG 0.56 -0.10 0.15 -0.01 0.03 -0.08 - - - - - - - 0.48 - - -
ISP 0.57 -0.02 0.17 -0.08 0.02 -0.06 - - - - - - - 0.45 - - -
BMPS 0.39 -0.04 0.11 0.02 0.03 -0.01 - - - - - - - 0.31 - - -
UBI 0.44 -0.07 0.14 -0.06 -0.02 -0.07 - - - - - - - 0.39 - - -
MB 0.47 -0.01 0.21 0.04 0.03 -0.03 - - - - - - - 0.37 - - -
BPE 0.38 -0.02 0.15 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 - - - - - - - 0.30 - - -
PMI 0.40 -0.03 0.20 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 - - - - - - - 0.34 - - -
CRG 0.33 -0.06 0.09 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 - - - - - - - 0.22 - - -
BPSO 0.35 -0.04 0.16 0.00 0.02 -0.01 - - - - - - - 0.29 - - -
CE 0.45 -0.04 0.16 0.00 0.02 -0.06 - - - - - - - 0.25 - - -
BOV 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.04 - - - - - - - - 0.46 - -
HSB 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.02 - - - - - - - - 0.54 - -
BCP 0.31 -0.09 0.16 0.03 0.01 -0.05 - - - - - - - - - 0.36 -
BPI 0.37 -0.07 0.16 0.02 0.01 -0.04 - - - - - - - - - 0.36 -
SAN 0.62 -0.04 0.19 -0.03 0.07 -0.06 - - - - - - - - - - 0.48
BBVA 0.63 -0.06 0.18 -0.02 0.06 -0.09 - - - - - - - - - - 0.49
SAB 0.42 -0.05 0.13 -0.03 0.03 -0.09 - - - - - - - - - - 0.33
POP 0.47 -0.06 0.14 -0.05 0.02 -0.07 - - - - - - - - - - 0.37
BKT 0.47 -0.06 0.13 -0.05 0.01 -0.11 - - - - - - - - - - 0.33
36
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.90
Table 15: Kendall’s tau between banks once conditionally on market factors under
CVine Structure
Country Banks
Austria EBS
Belgium KBC DEXB
KBC 1
DEXB 0.07 1
Cyprus HB
France BNP ACA GLE
BNP 1
ACA 0.30 1
GLE 0.35 0.26 1
Germany DBK CBK ARL
DBK 1
CBK 0.25 1
ARL 0.15 0.09 1
Greece ETE TPEIR ALPHA EUROB
ETE 1
TPEIR 0.24 1
ALPHA 0.20 0.24 1
EUROB 0.23 0.24 0.24 1
Ireland BKIR ALBK
BKIR 1
ALBK 0.26 1
Italy UCG ISP BMPS UBI MB BPE PMI CRG BPSO CE
UCG 1
ISP 0.11 1
BMPS 0.04 0.06 1
UBI 0.09 0.13 0.19 1
MB -0.01 0.05 0.07 0.09 1
BPE 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.16 0.03 1
PMI 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.12 1
CRG 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.01 1
BPSO -0.01 0.05 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.23 0.02 0.09 1
CE 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.08 1
Malta BOV HSB
BOV 1
HSB -0.16 1
Portugal BCP BPI
BCP 1
BPI 0.17 1
Spain SAN BBVA SAB POP BKT
SAN 1
BBVA 0.22 1
SAB 0.04 0.07 1
POP 0.08 0.10 0.29 1
BKT 0.01 0.10 0.20 0.17 1
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6.5 Shocks on Equity and Rate
Table 16: Responses of different assets to an extreme shock on MF
The table gives shocks to the two first MF (namely Equity and Rate) with two magnitudes
(the worst 1% and the worst 5% cases).
Market indexes Equity (1%) Equity (5%) Rate (1%) Rate (5%)
Eq -8.25% -4.87% 3.32% 2.10%
Rate 0.59% 0.39% -1.09% -0.70%
Sov 0.32% 0.22% -0.91% -0.51%
Corp 0.19% 0.16% -0.84% -0.47%
Fx -1.41% -0.72% 0.63% 0.45%
Com -2.40% -1.30% 1.11% 0.79%
AT -10.34% -5.02% 3.43% 2.20%
BE -8.29% -4.29% 2.53% 1.66%
CY -9.47% -5.69% 3.80% 2.36%
FR -9.23% -4.89% 3.03% 1.97%
DE -9.11% -4.63% 3.06% 1.95%
EL -8.29% -4.98% 3.09% 2.04%
IE -8.75% -4.34% 2.16% 1.40%
IT -10.81% -5.47% 3.14% 2.07%
MT -0.60% -0.30% 0.15% 0.12%
PT -6.88% -3.75% 2.16% 1.46%
ES -9.35% -5.12% 3.14% 2.08%
Bank Stocks
EBS -13.65% -7.03% 7.19% 4.28%
KBC -19.14% -8.44% 9.26% 5.02%
DEXB -13.59% -7.82% 8.00% 3.91%
HB -4.07% -3.74% 2.67% 2.01%
BNP -13.30% -6.74% 7.51% 4.16%
ACA -12.49% -7.18% 6.68% 3.96%
GLE -15.47% -8.36% 7.15% 4.38%
DBK -13.00% -6.41% 6.72% 3.54%
CBK -13.00% -7.30% 7.08% 3.91%
ARL -12.90% -7.11% 5.54% 3.39%
ETE -12.41% -7.55% 6.93% 3.79%
TPEIR -7.78% -7.11% 5.40% 4.03%
ALPHA -6.59% -6.03% 5.47% 3.94%
EUROB -7.91% -7.24% 6.90% 5.23%
BKIR -17.41% -9.49% 10.97% 5.69%
ALBK -16.16% -9.29% 11.32% 6.35%
UCG -15.05% -7.91% 7.01% 4.24%
ISP -12.36% -6.50% 5.08% 3.24%
BMPS -6.03% -5.53% 3.11% 2.24%
UBI -8.23% -5.15% 4.59% 2.87%
MB -5.09% -4.62% 2.98% 2.22%
BPE -7.47% -4.64% 3.85% 2.30%
PMI -10.00% -5.98% 4.72% 2.88%
CRG -7.55% -4.64% 3.56% 2.08%
BPSO -4.58% -3.18% 2.53% 1.65%
CE -9.10% -5.26% 4.47% 2.86%
BOV -1.04% -0.49% -0.14% 0.00%
HSB -1.17% -0.59% 0.00% 0.07%
BCP -11.51% -6.28% 2.87% 2.48%
BPI -7.75% -4.77% 4.73% 2.98%
SAN -12.06% -6.16% 5.06% 3.09%
BBVA -12.19% -6.48% 5.14% 3.28%
SAB -6.89% -4.50% 4.45% 2.66%
POP -9.80% -6.15% 5.24% 3.14%
BKT -5.33% -4.86% 4.12% 3.16%
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6.6 Equity shortfall ranking
Table 17: Shortfalls on the equity buffer after a shock on the equity risk factor
2006 2010 2014
DBK -9,6763119 DBK -43,509716 ACA -29,761821
CBK -4,5558533 ACA -35,489341 DBK -25,636556
ACA -2,63714 BNP -30,322182 BNP -19,763767
ARL 0,1463857 GLE -21,217006 GLE -18,04954
HB 0,34858189 CBK -16,645089 DEXB -7,6053193
DEXB 1,89069216 DEXB -14,621407 CBK -6,9009101
CE 2,06862109 UCG -10,098187 BMPS -3,2641645
BKT 2,47704986 ISP -8,7152243 UCG -2,9294483
BPSO 2,72374783 KBC -5,1279908 CRG -0,5660037
BCP 2,99025722 BMPS -4,5662398 EUROB -0,4315783
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